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Although political scientists have studied 
Congress and other legislative bodies for 
many years, they have been relatively un­
successful in developing a general theory of 
legislative behavior. Picking and choosing 
from the conceptual stores of sociology and 
psychology, political scientists have or­
ganized their research around concepts 
such as role, norm, integration, etc. Almost 
without exception the resulting partial 
theories are quite vaguely formulated, so 
that one cannot determine which proposi­
tions strictly derive from the theory. In 
other words, though we have good descrip­
tive information about how certain legis­
latures work, we have a very limited set of 
theoretical propositions that can help to 
explain these workings. Still, some scholars 
appear to have excellent intuitions about 
how alterations in various internal or ex­
ternal institutions affect the operation of 
legislatures and their policy output. Thus, 
we believe there is a deeper understanding 
of legislative behavior than the lack of a 
theoretical superstructure suggests. 
In recent years several developments 
have shown some promise of filling the 
theoretical gaps in the study of legislative 
behavior. First, game theorists and social 
choice theorists have begun to formulate 
abstract models of simple legislatures. 
Thus we now have a short but growing list 
of propositions about legislative behavior 
and policy making in certain highly sim­
plified situations. Second, some empirical 
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researchers have gradually become aware 
that legislators are goal-seeking agents who 
choose from available strategic alterna­
tives to further their ends. Some recent 
empirical work reflects this realization. 
Third, a number of scholars have been 
working to bridge the gap between highly 
abstract social-choice and game-theoretic 
models of legislatures on the one hand and 
detailed empirical studies of legislatures on 
the other. In this necessarily short review 
we will provide a brief survey of the work 
underlying each of these developments. 
The discussion which follows proceeds in 
stages from the abstract constructions of 
the game theorists to the more concrete 
descriptions of empirical researchers. 
I. Game Theory and the 
Legislative Process 
Since the publication of The Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior, several au­
thors have proposed simple game-theoretic 
models of legislatures. In this section we 
describe the basic elements of such models 
and discuss the kinds of propositions they 
imply. Game-theoretic models typically 
have a set of actors, each of whom have 
preferences defined over a set of "alterna­
tives" or "social states." These preferences 
are usually assumed to satisfy certain ra­
tionality properties. Subsets of the set of 
actors are called coalitions and coalitional 
preference is usually defined as follows: 
coalition is said to prefer x toy if and only 
if each of its members prefers x toy. 
A principal notion in game-theoretic 
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analysis of legislatures is the idea of coali­
tional power. One way to formulate this 
notion is as a characteristic function. The 
characteristic function is a mapping from 
coalitions into subsets of the alternatives, 
which specifies for each coalition in its do­
main the alternatives that coalition can 
enforce (S. D. Bloomfield and R. B. Wil­
son). Another way of conceptualizing 
coalitional power is a set of binary ef ective­
ness relations, one for each coalition, which 
describe for each coalition its ability to 
determine the outcome of the legislative 
process on pairs. That is, if a given coali­
tion is effective for x against y, then it can 
ensure that if the legislature is choosing 
between x and y, x will be chosen. A game 
is simply the set of players and the set of 
alternatives together with a list of permis­
sible or formable coalitions and some de­
scription of the powers of the formable 
coalitions. 
The three elements introduced thus far 
(preferences held by the members, formable 
coalitions, and powers of each of the form­
able coalitions) enable us to make some 
statements about what a legislature will do 
when faced with particular choices. One 
can define a dominance relation as follows: 
x dominates y if and only if there is a per­
missible coalition that can ensure x and 
which prefers x toy. In the next section we 
will review the work of a number of 
scholars who have placed sufficient re­
strictions on the distribution of legislator 
preferences to ensure the existence of an 
undominated element. As is well known, 
however, IDthout such restrictions many 
legislative institutions cannot be counted 
on to produce a dominance relation which 
has an undominated element. This has led 
some scholars to theorize about what will 
happen if no undominated element exists. 
Several authors have developed solution 
concepts that allow one to make assertions 
about what will happen in games without 
undominated elements (G. Owen). Un-
fortunately, the solution concepts ad­
vanced thus far typically do not make 
very strong statements about the out­
comes of a game. In many games of in­
terest the solutions constitute a very large 
set relative to the set of possible outcomes. 
As a result William Riker suggests that 
while we may be unable to predict what 
alternatives will be chosen in a given 
legislative situation, we may be able to 
make assertions about which coalitions 
wiil form and/ or remain stable. He pro­
poses a rule-the size principle-which as­
serts that in constant-sum games of per­
fect information only minimal-winning 
coalitions form. This principle has received 
careful attention from theorists (Robert 
Butterworth, Kenneth A. Shepsle 1974a, 
1974b, Richard McKelvey), but its status 
as a theoretical proposition remains am­
biguous. ForJ except in noncontroversial 
cases in which an undominated element 
exists, each alternative is dominated by 
some other, so that even if a minimal­
winning coalition moves the legislative 
from y to x, another coalition could move 
the legislative from x to z. In general, one 
cannot expect coalitions to be stable. Per­
haps Riker is using the notion of coalition 
formation in a somewhat different sense 
than is natural in a game-theoretic termi­
nology. One might define a somewhat dif­
ferent concept of coalition formation and 
argue that even when the domination rela­
tion is cyclic only minimal-winning coali­
tions form. Recently McKelvey has shown 
that, if a certain restriction is placed on 
the payoff configurations that are admis­
sible, a version of the size principle follows. 
As a descriptive principle, however, the 
condition McKelvev proposes is dubious. 
A number of political researchers have 
conducted empirical studies to see how 
accurate the size principle is as a descrip­
tive hypothesis. Some examples are those 
by David Koehler, Barbara Hinckley, and 
David Moore. None of these authors finds 
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a pronounced tendency for minimal-winning 
coalitions to form in legislative voting be­
havior. Thus, the size principle does not 
appear to describe legislative coalition 
formation, at least as measured in these 
studies. Nonetheless, despite its limited 
theoretical and empirical support, many 
scholars (of both theoretical and empirical 
inclinations) find the size principle in­
tuitively appealing. 
II. Spatial Models of Legislatures 
In spatial models of legislatures the set 
of alternatives is assumed to be a subset of 
Euclidean space, and each legislator is as­
sumed to have a most preferred point 
within the subset. Legislator preferences 
may be positively monotonic in distance 
(Duncan Black), convex, and representable 
hy a differentiable utility function (Charles 
Plott), convex (Judith Sloss), and/or 
separable (Gerald Kramer). The basic idea 
of this type of models is to provide condi­
tions on preferences sufficient to ensure 
the existence of an undominated point in 
the set of alternatives. 
Black proves that if preferences are con­
vex (i.e., single peaked) in a one-dimen­
sional Euclidean space and if each person 
votes for the alternative he prefers in each 
pairwise contest, then there is an alterna­
tive (the median position) that cannot be 
defeated in a pairwise majority vote. As is 
well known, if the dimensionality of the 
space exceeds one, convexity is no longer a 
sufficient condition for the existence of an 
undominated element. 
Plott provides a set of sufficient condi­
tions for the existence of an undominated 
element when the set of alternatives is a 
subset of an n-dimensional Euclidean 
space, and each voter has a concave, dif­
ferentiable utility function on the set. 
Plott's condition roughly may be stated as 
follows. If there is an odd number of voters 
and they are arranged in a subset of 
Euclidean space in such a way that one 
voter is located at an interior point, x, then 
x is an undominated point if and only if 
for each utility gradient pointing in a 
given direction there is another pointing 
in the opposite direction. Sloss generalized 
Plott's theorem to weaken the requirement 
that voters have differentiable utility 
functions. She requires only that voter 
preferences be quasi-transitive and satisfy 
a certain convexity property. In her work 
convex cones with "gradientlike" prop­
erties play much the same role as the 
gradients in Plott's theorem. 
Kramer extends results of Black, A. K. 
Sen, and others to the case of a multidi­
mensional space of alternatives by giving 
a class of sufficient conditions for the ex­
istence of an undominated element. He 
argues that the class of conditions which he 
and Plott provide are so restrictive they 
are "unlikely to be satisfied in practice ex­
cept by care and lucky accident" (Kramer 
1973, p. 296). 
In another contribution Kramer (1972) 
shows that if legislators have convex and 
separable preferences over a subset of an 
n-dimensional Euclidean space, if motions 
to amend the status quo, x, can change the 
status quo in at most one component (i.e., 
issue) at a time, and if legislators vote for 
a motion if and only if they are made bet­
ter off by its passage, then there exists a 
point which is undominated. That is, if 
legislators do not cooperate too extensively 
in making their voting decisions, the rules 
restricting the agenda may create undomi­
nated elements. Of course such procedural 
devices will be ineffective if legislators co­
ordinate their voting strategies sufficiently. 
Nevertheless, such coordination may be 
costly enough that the conditions of the 
theorem are sometimes met in practice. 
III. Vote Trading 
Some authors have suggested that vote 
trading is a desirable activity in legisla­
tures and that it may lead to outcomes 
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socially superior to sincere voting out­
comes (James Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock). Numerous papers on vote trad­
ing have been published, but one finds a 
notable lack of consensus among their au­
thors both on definitions and conclusions. 
The most important accepted result is the 
following: if any trade may occur among 
legislators, and if legislator preferences are 
separable, a point, x, is an equilibrium in 
the vote-trading process if and only if it is 
the outcome of issue-by-issue voting with 
no trades occurring. Of course the trading 
process may have no equilibrium. (See 
Koehler 1975, Peter Bernholz, Joseph 
Kadane, and Ferejohn 1974b.) The basic 
idea of the proofs is simply that if any 
coalition may be organized costlessly to 
carry out a trade, and if the ultimate deci­
sion rule is the method of majority deci­
sion, then informal or formal institutions 
may always be circumvented by an appro­
priately organized majority. Only to the 
extent that trades are costly to implement 
and to police can formal or informal insti­
tutions create undominated elements where 
none would exist under simple majority 
rule with sincere voting. 
We think that this observation may be 
of considerable importance in understand­
ing how an institution like the Congress 
works. The Congress is not merely a bi­
cameral body with decisions in each house 
made by simple majority rule. Rather, 
there are a number of formal and informal 
institutions (the committees, the parties, 
the state party delegations, the leadership 
systems, the policy groups, etc.) which 
hold more or less regular places in the 
legislative process. The presence of such 
institutions makes some coalitions cheap 
to organize and others much less so. Differ­
ential organization costs may affect not 
only the existence of equilibria, but also 
the distributive consequences of policy 
outcomes (Ferejohn, 1974a). While little 
theoretical or empirical work has taken 
place along these lines, it appears that 
members of certain institutions within the 
Congress have distinct advantages with 
respect to particular legislative outputs. 
The existence of regular distributional ef­
fects is difficult to explain without some 
notion that certain coalitions are more 
difficult to form than others (namely those 
that could upset the allocation in ques­
tion). 
IV. Models of the Committee
Assignment Process
While legislation may be proposed and 
amended on the floor of either chamber of 
the Congress, in practice this almost never 
happens. Instead, a proposed bill is re­
ferred to a committee, which then decides 
whether the bill will be reported to the 
whole chamber and, if so, in what form. 
As a rule, few amendments are offered on 
the floor (although committee to commit­
tee variation is wide) and even fewer are 
successful. But although most of the policy 
output of the Congress is determined in 
committee, little attention has been de­
voted to incorporating the standing com­
mittee system into models of the Congres­
sional process. Recently, however, theorists 
have focused on one aspect of the commit­
tee system-the assignment process. Using 
simple optimizing models they can success­
fully account for most of the available 
data about Congressional committee as­
signments. Unlike models which require 
only that legislators be rational agents 
(i.e., that they be maximizing something) 
the assignment models postulate a specific 
objective function which the Committee 
on Committees tries to maximize. 
The assignment process operates as fol­
lows. Newly elected Congressmen and 
those dissatisfied with their current assign­
ments submit requests to their party's 
Committee on Committees. These requests 
take the form of partial rankings of the 
committees of the House. The Committee 
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on Committees then meets to consider 
these requests and make the actual assign­
ments. There are some formal restraints on 
assignments: all members must receive a 
committee; members may be placed on one 
exclusive committee, or on one semiexclu­
sive and one nonexclusive committee, or on 
two nonexclusive committees. Additionally, 
the descriptive literature identifies various 
informal constraints on assignments: no 
freshmen on exclusive committees; re­
served seats for certain states on certain 
committees; higher priority for noI\fresh­
men requesters than for freshmen. 
In Shepsle's (1975) model of the assign­
ment process, both the informal constraints 
and the ranking information about re­
quests are omitt<cd. Instead, Shepsle as­
sumes that the Committee on Committees 
maximizes the number of requests satisfied. 
Using data only for freshmen requesters 
and for the Democratic Committee on 
Committees for four Congresses, Shepsle 
finds that this extremely simple model ac­
counts for "most" of the assignments in 
the following sense: while it might be pos­
sible to satisfy a few more requests by re­
arranging assignments, the number of 
feasible assignments is so large and the 
search costs sufficiently high that the ac­
tual assignments seem a reasonable ap­
proximation to the optimum. 
Michael Cohen's model employs a simi­
lar objective function. Interestingly, the 
Committee on Committees allegedly con­
siders the committees in alphabetic order. 
After studying the consequences of various 
sequential assignment methods, Cohen 
concludes that quite different assignments 
would result if assignments were considered 
in other sequences. 
The relatively good fit of the Shepsle and 
Cohen models suggests that committees 
are made up largely of self-selected mem­
bers. Farm state Representatives migrate 
to Agriculture; Western Representatives 
gravitate to Interior. Given that the com-
mittees exercise a great deal of influence in 
writing legislation, the end result is a situa­
tion in which policy advocates write public 
policy for the whole Congress. In an in­
teresting work William Niskanen examines 
the consequences of a system in which 
committees dominated by program advo­
cates write legislation; he concludes that 
such a system has undesirable allocative 
properties. Ferejohn's (1974a) empirical 
study of Congressional policy making in 
the area of water resources supports 
Niskanen's conclusions. 
V. Models of Roll Call Voting 
One of the most conspicuous aspects of 
legislative behavior is the roll call vote. 
The voting records constitute a happy 
hunting ground for statistically oriented 
political scientists, and a few models of the 
vote decision now exist. 
Duncan MacRae first proposed a model 
of roll call voting. The model is theoreti­
cally quite ambitious: it attempts to inte­
grate a spatial model of electoral behavior 
in the constituency with a spatial model of 
roll call voting in the legislature. Repre­
sentatives do not simply take the median 
position of their districts in this model be­
cause their votes depend on their personal 
policy preferences, their electoral margins, 
and the overall "political complexion" of 
their districts, in addition to their consti­
tuents' approval and disapproval. Given 
the relative complexity of the model, gen­
eral results are somewhat hard to come by. 
In another contribution, Fiorina (1974) 
views Representatives as using their vote 
either to maximize their probability of re­
election or to maintain it at some per­
sonally satisfactory level. In this model 
Representatives make decisions under un­
certainty about the likelihood that their 
vote will elicit an electoral reward or pun­
ishment of a given magnitude. The homo­
geneity of a district's group structure 
emerges as critical in Fiorina's model. Op-
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timal roll call voting strategies always exist 
in homogeneous districts, but not in hetero­
geneous districts. Other propositions in the 
model concern the effects of (1) variations 
in rewards and punishments stemming 
from votes, (2) the likelihood a vote will 
become a campaign issue, and (3) absten­
tion. 
In contrast, Jane Gilbert offers a de­
cision-making-under-certainty model of 
Congressional roll call voting. She assumes 
Congressmen desire only 50 percent +e of 
the vote. In the model, this limited elec­
toral objective frees them to cast other 
votes with party leaders in order to build 
up credit within the institution. The num­
ber of free votes Congressmen have de­
pends on two dimensions of district hetero­
geneity: consensus and diversity (the for­
mer refers to agreement on a single roll 
call, the latter to agreement across a series 
of roll calls). Interestingly, Gilbert's con­
clusions about the effects of district hetero­
geneity directly contradict Fiorina's. In 
the Gilbert model, Congressmen wish to 
have diverse districts-they should be 
willing to ask state legislatures to redistrict 
them out of safe, homogeneous districts. 
This startling difference between the two 
models stems largely from the differing 
candidate-objective functions assumed. In 
Gilbert's model candidates strive to get 
only one vote more than a tie. If' were set 
higher, say 10 percent, the conclusions of 
the Gilbert and Fiorina models would be 
similar. 
VI. Mainstream Political Science and
Optimizing Models of Congress 
Of the models thus far discussed, only a 
minority have been the creation of politi­
cal scientists. As a discipline, political 
science has been influenced far more by 
sociology and social psychology than by 
economics. Research on Congress, in par­
ticular, is organized around concepts such 
as "role," "norm," and "socialization" 
rather than "preference," "choice," and 
"maximization." But, very recently, main­
stream Congressional scholars have given 
strong indications that they are broaden­
ing their collection of intellectual tools. 
For example, Richard Fenno presents a 
large-scale comparative study of Congres­
sional committees within the framework of 
a purposive analytical model. Fenno sees 
Congressmen as desiring reelection, good 
public policy, and institutional influence­
different mixes for different Representa­
tives. The committees, in turn, offer differ­
ing opportunities to satisfy these differing 
goals (e.g., Public Works or Interior are 
clearly more valuable for electoral pur­
poses than Foreign Affairs). Fenno ar­
gues that Congressmen's goals affect the 
committee assignments they seek and, in 
conjunction with the political environment, 
the formal structure and informal proce­
dures of the committees. 
Other empirical works which show the 
utility of purposive models of behavior in­
clude James T. Murphy's analysis of the 
House Public Works Committee decision 
making, John F. Manley's study of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, Bar­
bara Deckard's analysis of state delega­
tions in the House of Representatives, 
David Rohde's and Shepsle's examination 
of commi ttec requests in the House of 
Representatives, John Kingdon's excellent 
study of roll call voting decisions, .and 
David Mayhew's interpretative review of 
the Congressional literature. 
Empirical research on legislatures has 
yielded more than detailed descriptions of 
Congressional institutions, processes, and 
behavior. It also has provided a grow­
ing list of regularities which seem sturdy 
enough to bear close theoretical examina­
tion. Some of these observations are as old 
as the hills, but receive support from recent 
work as well: the work of the Congress is 
done in committees; committee decisions 
are seldom overturned on the floor; party 
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membership is the single most important 
predictor of roll call votes; certain com­
mittees (such as Appropriations and Ways 
and Means) are consistently more success­
ful on the floor than are others (Education 
and Labor or Agriculture, for example). 
There are other such propositions which 
could be culled from an examination of the 
empirical literature. To a surprising extent 
these propositions appear to hold not 
merely in the House and Senate, but also 
in many state legislatures as well. 
The existence of empirical regularities 
in a relatively wide variety of legislative 
situations (across time as well as cross­
sectionally) is a challenge to theorists. 
What is it about legislative bodies that 
makes committee decisions tend to remain 
stable during floor consideration under 
simple majority rule? The empirical litera­
ture on Congress indicates not only that 
seemingly undominated alternatives exist, 
but that these alternatives regularly 
emerge as committee bills. The theoretical 
literature suggests that this is an extra­
ordinarily improbable state of affairs. 
Surely we should search for an explanation 
of this phenomenon. 
In our opinion, the theoretical literature 
on legislative bodies is sufficiently ad­
vanced that we may begin to hope for an­
swers to the preceding kind of question. 
One would hope that over the next few 
years theorists will take the body of em­
pirical research seriously enough to at­
tempt to provide explanations for observed
regularities, and simultaneously to provide 
a theoretical base for future empirical re­
search. 
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